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SO THE ARMY HIRED AN AX-MURDERER: THE
ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCEPTION TO THE
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT DOES NOT BAR SUITS
FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION AND
SUPERVISION
Rebecca L. Andrews
Abstract: The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the federal government's
sovereign immunity as to claims for injuries caused by an act or omission of a government
employee within his or her scope of duty. However, this waiver is not absolute and the
government has retained immunity for many claims, including those arising out of an assault
or battery. The federal circuit courts are split regarding whether this exception applies to
claims for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of federal employees who commit
an assault or battery. While the U.S. Supreme Court has left the question unanswered, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that such claims are allowed, while most other
circuits have taken the opposite view. This Comment argues that claims for the negligent
hiring, retention and supervision of federal employees are not barred by the assault and
battery exception to the FTCA. The legislative history and intent of the FTCA urge such a
reading, as does recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. Finally, any danger that barred claims
may be disguised as claims for negligent hiring, retention and supervision can be avoided
through the use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTRODUCTION
Marvin, a recruiter for the United States Army, visited the home of a
young potential enlistee.' While in her home as a representative of the
United States government, he assaulted and raped her. When Marvin had
applied to enlist in the Army he failed to note on his application that he
had served time in a state prison. Disregarding its own procedures, the
Army did not investigate whether Marvin had a criminal record. Such an
investigation would have revealed that Marvin had previously been
convicted of forcibly raping a minor female. This conviction may have
rendered Marvin ineligible to join the Army. Because of its own
negligence in hiring Marvin, the government not only approved of
Marvin's enlistment but placed him in the recruitment office where he
would have frequent contact with young women. While the
government's negligence in hiring, retaining and supervising Marvin was
a proximate cause of the victim's injury in this case and the claim for
compensation arises out of this negligence as well as the assault and
I. Hypothetical created by the author.
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battery, many federal courts would not allow the victim to recover
against the United States government.2
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) is a waiver of sovereign
immunity that allows individuals to sue the federal government for
injuries suffered as a result of government negligence.3 The FTCA is not
a complete waiver because Congress has created several exceptions to it.4
One such exception is labeled the "intentional tort exception" or the
"assault and battery exception."5 This exception retains the federal
government's sovereign immunity for all claims arising "out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution." 6 However, it does not cover all intentional torts, including
the intentional infliction of emotional distress or rape.7
Courts vary in their interpretation of the assault and battery exception.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the assault and battery exception
does not bar claims for government negligence that proximately causes
an assault or battery by a federal employee, when there is an independent
duty owed by the government to the plaintiff.' Some courts interpret this
exception to allow only claims for antecedent government negligence in
performing a duty owed the plaintiff unrelated to the government's
employment relationship with the assailant.9 These courts have held that
the assault and battery exception bars claims based on the negligent
hiring, retention and supervision of government employees,"° sometimes
arguing that such claims are respondeat superior in disguise." The
2. The Second, Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits, as well as a federal district court for the district
of Maine, have all either held, or implied, that they would not allow this hypothetical victim to
recover. See infra notes 98-104 and 170-209 and accompanying text.
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1), 2670-2680 (2000).
4. Id. § 2680.
5. See Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 400 (1988); Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d
1437, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996). Because this Comment deals exclusively with assault and battery, the
exception will be labeled the "assault and battery exception" throughout.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
7. Id.
8. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 403.
9. See, e.g., Guccione v. United States, 878 F.2d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1989); Lilly v. United States, 141
F. Supp. 2d 626, 628-29 (S.D. W. Va. 2001); LaFrancis v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 2d 335, 341-
42 (D. Conn. 1999).
10. See, e.g., Lilly, 141 F. Supp. 2d at 628; La Francis, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 342; Guccione, 878 F.2d
at 33.
11. See Guccione v. United States, 847 F.2d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1988), rehearing denied, 878
F.2d 32 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Supreme Court has not, however, required this reading12 and the Ninth
Circuit has refused to adopt it. 3 Instead, the Ninth Circuit has read the
assault and battery exception to allow federal district courts jurisdiction
over claims of negligence directly related to the employment relationship
between the government and the assailant, including claims for negligent
hiring, retention and supervision.' 4
This Comment argues that the assault and battery exception to the
FTCA is not a bar to claims against the United States government for the
negligent hiring, retention and supervision of government employees
who commit assault and battery outside - of the scope of their
employment. Part I outlines the distinction between claims based on
respondeat superior and those based on negligent hiring, retention and
supervision. Part II reviews the statutory language and legislative history
of the FTCA and the assault and battery exception. Part III traces the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the assault and battery exception. Part
IV details the lower courts' reactions to the Supreme Court's decisions.
Finally, Part V argues that the FTCA grants federal district court
jurisdiction over claims for the negligent hiring, retention and
supervision of government employees who commit assault and battery
outside of their scope of duty.
1. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR AND NEGLIGENT HIRING,
RETENTION AND SUPERVISION ARE PRACTICALLY AND
ANALYTICALLY DISTINCT
According to tort law, both today and at the time of the FTCA's
passage in 1946, an employer may be liable for an employee's tort under
at least two theories: (1) respondeat superior and (2) negligent hiring,
retention or supervision.'" Under respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for an employee's tort regardless of fault.' 6 Under negligent hiring,
retention or supervision, if the employer knew or should have known that
the employee would likely subject third parties to an unreasonable risk of
12. See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 403 n.8.
13. See, e.g., Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996); Brock v. United
States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995); Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.
1986).
14. See, e.g., Senger, 103 F.3d at 1442; Brock, 64 F.3d at 1425; Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1504.
15. See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996); 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472
(1996).
16. See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996); WILLIAM J. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF TORTS 473-75 (1941).
Washington Law Review
harm an employer can be held liable for an employee's intentional tort. 7
Under a traditional tort law analysis these two theories of liability are
analytically distinct.'8  Negligent hiring, retention and supervision
requires a negligent act or acts on the part of a supervising employee
while respondeat superior has no such requirement."9
A. Respondeat Superior
The doctrine of respondeat superior is based on the vicarious liability
of an employer for an employee's torts committed within the scope of
employment.2" Although the employer may not be at fault, the employer
may still be liable under state tort law for injuries caused by its employee
acting within his or her scope of duty." The policy rationales behind
respondeat superior include compensating the plaintiff, preventing future
tortious conduct, and allocating risk to those most able to pay and to
those who benefit from the employee's actions.2
The meaning of "scope of duty" is vague, and at the time of the
FTCA's passage it could be decided by a number of factors.23 Such
factors included the time, place, and purpose of the act, whether it was a
task normally undertaken by servants, whether it was the kind of task the
employee was employed to perform, and whether it was motivated by the
desire to further the employer's purposes.24 The fact than an employee's
action is improper or prohibited does not automatically exempt it from
the employee's scope of duty if it satisfies some of the other factors
listed above.25 The U.S. Supreme Court, state courts and a leading
commentator have all noted that an employer may be vicariously liable
for its employees' intentional torts committed while acting within the
17. See 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
18. See id.; 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
19. See 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996); 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788
(1996). Because an employer as an incorporeal entity cannot act without the action of its employees,
both of these torts are forms of vicarious liability. For the purposes of this article, the actions of a
supervising employee will be ascribed to the employer while those of an employee acting outside of
his or her scope of duty will not.
20. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
21. Id.
22. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
23. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 476.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228, at 504 (1958).
25. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 476.
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scope of duty.26 In these situations, the employment relationship is
enough to create the liability without any independent action attributable
to the employer." Because the employer's liability does not depend upon
the employer's independent negligent or wrongful conduct, respondeat
superior does not create an independent cause of action, but merely
extends liability for damages from the employee to the employer.28
B. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision
In contrast to the doctrine of respondeat superior, negligent hiring,
retention and supervision requires a negligent act or omission on the part
of the employer.29 While the plaintiff pleading respondeat superior does
not need to demonstrate that the employer acted negligently, a plaintiff
pleading negligent hiring, retention and supervision must demonstrate
that the employer was negligent.30 At the time of the FTCA's passage,
the doctrine of negligent hiring, retention and supervision was still in its
infancy and would have fallen under the duty to exercise control over the
actions of others.3' According to commentator William J. Prosser it had
been recognized in 1941 that employers owe a duty to prevent their
employees from harming others even in the absence of a special
relationship to the victim. Today, a contemporary plaintiff arguing that
an employer violated this duty must prove that the employer knew or
should have known that the employee would likely subject third parties
to an unreasonable risk of harm.33
26. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 756 (1998); Hechinger Co. v.
Johnson, 761 A.2d 15, 24-25 (D.C. 2000) (stating that if employee acts in part to serve employer's
interest, employer will be held liable for intentional torts of employee even if prompted partially by
personal motives, such as revenge); Clark v. Pangan, 998 P.2d 268, 270-71 (Utah 2000) (noting
Utah has long held an employer can be vicariously liable for intentional torts of employees acting
within scope of duty); Jordan v. Cates, 935 P.2d 289, 292 (Okla. 1997) (noting requirements to
establish employer liability for intentional tort of employee); PROSSER, supra note 16, at 476 (noting
an employer may be liable for the intentional torts of its employee in certain circumstances).
27. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
28. See id.
29. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 219, at 481 (1958) (stating that masters are not liable for the tort of a servant if that
servant was "acting outside of the scope of employment unless the master (a) intended the conduct
or the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or reckless.... (emphasis added)).
30. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
31. See PROSSER, supra note 16, at 198-200.
32. Id.
33. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
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The policy rationales behind respondeat superior mentioned above
highlight the differences between respondeat superior and negligent
hiring, retention and supervision. In the case of respondeat superior there
is a deliberate decision by the court to place liability with the employer
even though the only cause of the injury is the employee's action.34 This
decision is based on the policies of compensating the plaintiff,
preventing future tortious conduct, and allocating risk to those most able
to pay and to those who benefit from the employee's actions.35 In
contrast, in the case of negligent hiring, retention and supervision there
are at least two causes of the injury: negligence attributed to the
employer and the employee's tortious action.36
In sum, the tort of negligent hiring, retention and supervision requires
an affirmative, negligent action on the part of the employer. This same
action is not a requirement of respondeat superior. Thus, these torts are
different and distinct.
II. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The FTCA grants jurisdiction to federal district courts to hear claims
against the United States government for injuries caused by the negligent
or wrongful acts of its employees.37 The FTCA was passed in 1946 to
provide an effective means of resolving citizens' tort claims against the
federal government.3" Without the FTCA, courts would not have
jurisdiction to hear these claims because the federal government, as
sovereign, would be immune from suit.39 If a court finds at any time that
the alleged tort does not fall within the parameters of the FTCA, it must
dismiss the claim immediately as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(h)(3).4
There are many exceptions to the FTCA, since Congress did not waive
immunity for all torts.4 ' One such exception is the assault and battery
exception that retains governmental immunity for any claim that "arises
34. See id.
35. SeeMi.
36. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
37. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (2000).
38. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15,25 (1953).
39. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).
40. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(3).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000).
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out of' an assault or battery.42 Although there is little legislative history
for this particular exception, the limited history suggests that the
government was concerned about the financial danger of liability for the
intentionally tortious acts of its employees. 3
A. Legislative History and Procedural Context of the FTCA
Before the passage of the FTCA, the federal government was immune
from suit for torts committed by its employees by virtue of the doctrine
of sovereign immunity." The source of this doctrine is unclear; some say
it springs from the Constitution while others insist that it is a child of
English common law.45 Regardless of its source, sovereign immunity has
been widely criticized as unjust and the federal government has slowly
been picking away at the concept by enacting legislation that waives it in
certain circumstances. 6 One such piece of legislation is the FTCA.47
In response to a need for a simple way to compensate victims, in 1946
Congress passed the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680, which
provides federal district court jurisdiction over claims against the United
States Government for personal injuries caused by certain types of
government negligence. The FTCA specifically allows for the recovery
of damages for injury "caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment." '49 Prior to the FTCA's passage the
only redress for these injuries was a private bill passed by Congress, a
process which was cumbersome and provided compensation for only a
fraction of the claims made. The FTCA was passed both to cure this
42. Id. § 2680(h).
43. See Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1954) (describing legislative history
of § 2680(h) as "meager").
44. See Dep't of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer,
510 U.S. 471,475 (1994)).
45. Timothy J. Simeone, Comment, Rule 11 and Federal Sovereign Immunity: Respecting the
Explicit Waiver Requirement, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1046 n.16 (1993).
46. See. e.g., Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. at 260.
47. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (2000).
48. Id. § 1346.
49. Id.
50. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25, 25 n.9 (1953); Irvin M. Gottlieb, The Federal
Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1946) (noting that "more than 2,000
private claim bills are introduced in each Congress, a substantial percentage of which are claims for
property damage or personal injury .... [T]he cost of passing a single private claim bill amounted to
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perennial Congressional headache and to address the need for access to
the courts for the mass of citizens injured by government negligence that
were not served by the private bill procedure."
A claim can be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any
time if it is excepted from the FTCA1 2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(3) states that when a lack of subject matter jurisdiction becomes
apparent to the court, the court must dismiss the claim." Because the
FTCA is a grant of jurisdiction, claims that are barred by one of its
exceptions must be dismissed at once. 4 Additionally, the government has
only provided for bench trials in cases asserting tort liability of the
federal government." Thus, if a respondeat superior claim reaches trial in
the guise of a negligent hiring, retention or supervision claim, the subtle
distinction between these two doctrines will not be decided by an
untrained jury. 6
B. The Assault and Battery Exception to the FTCA
The waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the FTCA is not
absolute and the government has retained immunity from suit for many
intentional torts, including claims for assault and battery by federal
employees. 7 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) provides that the broad grant of
jurisdiction in the FTCA5" shall not apply to any claims "arising out of
assault [and] battery."59 While this Comment deals exclusively with the
assault and battery exception, the analysis herein may be applicable to
one or more of the other exceptions.
The legislative history of the assault and battery exception to the
FTCA, although sparse, implies that the government was concerned
almost $200" in 1942); H.R. REP. No. 667, at 1 (1926) (noting that in the last congress (the 68th)
"356 tort claims were presented to the House and only a small fraction of these became law").
51. See Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955).
52. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (mandating Federal Courts to dismiss cases for which they do not
have subject matter jurisdiction).
53. See id.
54. Seeid.; 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402; see also GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: CASES & MATERIALS 72-79 (2000).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402.
57. Id. § 2680. For example, Section 2680(h) contains exceptions for claims arising out of
discretionary functions, the loss, miscarriage or negligent transmission of mail, and an exception for
many intentional torts, including assault and battery. Id. §§ 2680(a), 2680(b), 2680(h).
58 Id. § 1346.
59. Id. § 2680(h).
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about the danger of liability for intentional torts that could be
exaggerated and easily proven.60 In Senate Committee hearings in the
76th Congress on an immunity-waiving bill similar to the FTCA, the
Justice Department's representative noted that the bill's assault and
battery exception corollary excluded those types of torts that "would be
difficult to make a defense against, and which are easily exaggerated."'
Thus, it appears Congress did not want to be automatically liable each
time one of the federal government's employees committed an assault
and battery.
The paucity of discussion of the FTCA does not provide a basis for
any firm conclusions as to Congress' intent regarding intentional torts
caused by negligence.62 As one commentator noted, the very sparseness
of Congress' discussion of this exception implies that Congress simply
divided the world of torts into those caused by negligence and those by
intention and did not pause to ponder those intentional torts that were
caused by antecedent governmental negligence.63 In the course of
Congressional hearings on a similar bill, the representative from the
Department of Justice urging passage of the bill was questioned as
follows:
Mr. Robsion. On that point of deliberate assault that is where some
agent of the Government gets in a fight with some fellow?
Mr. Shea. Yes.
Mr. Robsion. And socks him?
Mr. Shea. That is right ....
Mr. Cravens. This refers to a deliberate assault?
Mr. Shea. That is right.
Mr. Cravens. If he hit someone deliberately?
Mr. Shea. That is right.
Mr. Cravens. It is not intended to exclude negligent assaults?
60. See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary United States Senate, 76th Cong. 39 (1942).
61. See id.
62. See Pannella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 625 (2d. Cir. 1954); David M. Zolensky,
Comment, Section 2680(h) of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Government Liability for the Negligent
Failure to Prevent an Assault and Battery by a Federal Employee, 69 GEO. L.J. 803, 810 (1981).
63. See Zolensky, supra note 62, at 810.
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Mr. Shea. No. An injury caused by negligence could be considered
under the bill.'
This exchange suggests that Congress considered torts to be either
intentional or caused by negligence. Based on this limited legislative
history, it is unclear whether Congress contemplated or intended to bar
assaults and batteries caused by the negligent hiring, retention or
supervision of government employees.
In sum, the FTCA was clearly intended to provide a remedy for
individuals harmed by the negligence of the federal government. The
exceptions to the FTCA appear to have been intended to shield the
government from unwieldy claims founded on intentional torts.
Unfortunately, Congress' intent with regard to intentional torts
proximately caused by governmental negligence largely remains a
mystery.
III. INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT
Throughout the history of the assault and battery exception to the
FTCA, courts have conflicted in their interpretations of its breadth.65
Some courts, following a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court in United
States v. Shearer,66 adopted a but-for analysis, reasoning that if the
plaintiff's injury would not have been inflicted but-for an assault and
battery by a government employee, then the claim arose out of an assault
and battery and was barred.67 This framework, however, conflicted with
the Second Circuit's employee/non-employee analysis, which held that
the assault and battery exception only applied to assaults and batteries
committed by government employees, and not to assaults and batteries
committed by non-employees. 8 Ultimately, the Supreme Court adopted
this employee/non-employee framework in Sheridan v. United States69
64. Tort Claims: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 77th
Cong. 33-34 (1942).
65. Compare Thigpen v. United States, 800 F.2d 393, 394 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the assault
and battery exception barred any claim involving an assault and battery), with Bennett v. United
States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503-05 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing a claim to proceed which alleged negligent
hiring and retention of a federal employee who assaulted his students).
66. 473 U.S. 52, 54-57 (1985).
67. Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 394.
68. See Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1954).
69. 487 U.S. 392, 400-01 (1988).
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and modified it to include a distinction between employees acting within
the scope of duty and those acting outside of the scope of duty.7" This
modification meant that if an employee committed an assault and battery
outside of his or her scope of duty, and that assault and battery was also
caused by some type of government negligence predicated on a duty
owed the victim, the government could be held liable.7'
The Sheridan Court declined to decide whether the federal
government could ever be held liable for negligently hiring, retaining or
supervising employees who commit assaults and batteries outside of their
scope of duty.72 Although most circuits have read the assault and battery
exception to exclude claims for the negligent hiring, retention and
supervision of federal employees who commit assaults and batteries,73
the Ninth Circuit has maintained that such claims are allowed.74
A. A Broad Reading of the Assault and Battery Exception: United
States v. Shearer and the But-For Analysis
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sheridan,
many courts broadly interpreted the FTCA's assault and battery
exception. This broad reading was in response to the opinion of a
plurality of the Supreme Court in United States v. Shearer.76 The Shearer
plurality advanced a but-for analysis to the assault and battery
exception.77 The plurality reasoned that the exception's "arising out of'
language meant that any claim which would not exist but-for an assault
and battery was barred, regardless of the government's antecedent
negligence or any independent duty owed to the victim.
78
70. Id.
71. See infra notes 129-42 and accompanying text.
72. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 403 n.8.
73. See Jared M. Viders, Comment, Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Training-The Scope of
the Assault and Battery Exception: Senger v. United States, 39 B.C. L. REv. 452,452 n.6 (1998).
74. See, e.g., Senger v. United States, 103 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1996); Brock v. United
States, 64 F.3d 1421, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995); Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir.
1986).
75. See Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986); Thigpen v. United States, 800
F.2d 393, 395 (4th Cir. 1985); Johnson by Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir.
1986).
76. 473 U.S. 52 (1986); see Hoot, 790 F.2d at 838; Thigpen, 800 F.2d at 395; Johnson by
Johnson, 788 F.2d at 850.
77. See Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55.
78. Id. at 54-57.
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In Shearer, the mother of an off-duty serviceman sued the government
under the FTCA for negligent retention when another off-duty
serviceman, Private Heard, killed her son.79 Prior to this killing, Private
Heard was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to four years in
prison while assigned to an army base in Germany."0 The government
was aware of Private Heard's prior conviction and of his violent history.
Additionally, three of his superior officers had recommended that he be
removed from service, but the government did nothing."1 Further, the
army did not evaluate Private Heard's mental state until after he had
murdered the plaintiff's son. 2
While the plurality focused on the FTCA's assault and battery
exception, a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court decided Shearer based
on the Feres doctrine. 3 The Feres doctrine stems from the Court's
decision in Feres v. United States84 and stands for the principle "that a
soldier may not recover under the Federal Torts Claim Act for injuries
which 'arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.' 8 5
The majority of the Court stated that the Feres doctrine applied to the
facts of the Shearer case and reasoned that finding otherwise would
require courts to second-guess the decisions of commanding officers.8 6
A four-member plurality of the Court maintained that the claim was
barred by the FTCA's assault and battery exception as well as the Feres
doctrine.87 The plurality read the assault and battery exception in Section
2680(h) broadly: "[the assault and battery exception] does not merely bar
claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim
arising out of assault or battery. We read this provision to cover claims
like respondent's that sound in negligence but stem from a battery
committed by a Government employee." 8 In reaching this conclusion,
the plurality interpreted the legislative history of the assault and battery
exception to indicate that Congress expected that the federal government
79. Id. at 53.
80. Id. at 53-54.
81. United States v. Shearer, 723 F.2d 1102, 1104 (3d Cir. 1983) revd, 473 U.S. 52 (1985).
82. Id.
83. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57-59.
84. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
85. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57 (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 146 (1950)).
86. Id. at 52.
87. Id. at 54-56.
88. Id. at 55 (emphasis in original).
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would not be liable for the intentional torts of its employees.89 The
plurality reasoned this reading of the assault and battery exception was
confirmed by an amendment to the FTCA passed in 1974 that waived
sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the assaults and batteries of
law enforcement officers.9" This legislation did not mention that the
government would be liable for the negligent hiring, retention or
supervision of a government employee.9' Therefore, the plurality
reasoned, the premise of this legislation was that unamended, the FTCA
does not provide for government liability for these torts regardless of
antecedent government negligence.92
The Shearer plurality acknowledged Panella v. United States,93 a
Second Circuit case which held that the assault and battery exception
does not apply to the assaults and batteries of non-employees. 94 By
acknowledging Panella, the plurality implicitly accepted the reasoning
that the federal government is liable for a tort committed by a non-
employee that is proximately caused by the government's negligence,
although it is not liable for the same tort committed by a government
employee preceded by identical negligence. 95 In essence, the plurality
adopted a but-for test.96 If the plaintiff would not have a claim but-for the
federal employee committing an assault and battery, the government is
immune from suit regardless of the government's negligence.97
In the wake of Shearer, some courts followed the plurality's lead and
adopted a but-for test.98 The Fourth Circuit adopted the but-for test in
Thigpen v. United States.99 The Thigpen court relied on Shearer and
previous Fourth Circuit precedent to hold that the assault and battery
exception "bars any claim that depends on the existence of an assault and
battery."' ' The Second Circuit agreed in Johnson by Johnson v. United
89. Id.
90. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
91. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 55-56.
92. Id. at 56.
93. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954).
94. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 56-57 (citing Panella, 216 F.2d at 626).
95. Id.
96. See id. at 55.
97. See id.
98. See Hoot v. United States, 790 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1986); Thigpen v. United States, 800
F.2d 393, 395 (4th Cir. 1986); Johnson by Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 851 (2d Cir.
1986).
99. 800 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1986).
100. Id. at 395.
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States,10 1 stating that: "[t]he statute's plain language, 'arising out of,'
reflects an intent by Congress to bar a suit against the government for
injuries caused by a government employee's commission of an assault
and battery."'' 12 Finally, the Tenth Circuit embraced the but-for test in
Hoot v. United States,103 and opined that "[a]bsent the assault and battery
perpetrated on Hoot by Firth, there would be no claim. ''f °4
As set forth above, the Shearer plurality adopted a reading of the
assault and battery exception that denies government liability if a
plaintiffs claim is in any way premised on an assault and battery.
However, the Shearer plurality acknowledged that the government was
liable for the negligently caused assaults and batteries of non-employees.
In response to the Shearer plurality's reasoning, the Second, Fourth and
Tenth Circuits all adopted but-for tests for FTCA claims.
B. A Narrower Exception: Sheridan v. United States and the Search
for an Independent Duty
At the same time that the but-for test was developed, some courts
interpreted the assault and battery exception more narrowly. 1°5 These
courts concluded that the plaintiff had a cause of action if the
government owed the victim an independent duty and the assailant was
not an employee or was acting outside of the scope of duty.'0 6 This
interpretation of the assault and battery exception reads it in light of the
scope of the FTCA's waiver of immunity.0 7 Because the FTCA only
waives immunity for the negligent acts of government employees acting
within their scope of duty,'08 only those claims which would provide a
cause of action under this waiver are subject to the exception.' 9
Therefore, the assault and battery exception does not apply to claims
101. 788 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 850 (emphasis in original).
103. 790 F.2d 836 (10th Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 839.
105. See, e.g., Gibson v. United States, 457 F.2d 1391, 1394-97 (3d Cir. 1972); Loritts v. United
States, 489 F. Supp. 1030, 1031-32 (D. Mass. 1980); Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908,
912-13 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
106. See, e.g., Gibson, 457 F.2d at 1394-97; Loritts, 489 F. Supp. at 1031-32; Bryson, 463 F.
Supp. at 912-13.
107. See Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1954).
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2000).
109. See Panella, 216 F.2d at 624-25.
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stemming from an assault and battery committed by a non-employee or
by a government employee acting outside of his or her scope of duty."0
1. The Origins of the Independent Duty Test: Panella v. United States
The door to the independent duty test was first opened by the Second
Circuit in Panella v. United States when the court acknowledged that the
assault and battery exception does not apply to assaults and batteries by
non-employees.' While "[i]t is true that [the assault and battery
exception] can literally be read to apply to assaults committed by persons
other than government employees," the circuit court found this reading
inconsistent with the entire the FTCA." 2 The Second Circuit recognized
that the waiver of sovereign immunity only applies to negligent or
wrongful acts or omissions "of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment."' 3
The Second Circuit reasoned that an intentional tort committed by a
non-employee does not itself give rise to government liability, because
the FTCA only waives sovereign immunity for acts committed by
government employees acting within their scope of duty." 4 Because the
FTCA only grants federal district courts jurisdiction over the negligent
acts of government employees, the assault and battery exception cannot
apply to cases where the assault and battery is committed by a non-
employee." 5 In such cases, the antecedent negligence of the government
that proximately caused the assault and battery is the only remedy
available because the FTCA does not provide a remedy, barred or
otherwise." 6 Similarly, because there is no claim available for the assault
and battery itself, the root of the claim against the government is based in
negligence, not in assault and battery." 7
110. See Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 400-01(1988); Panella, 216 F.2d at 625.
111. See 216 F.2d at 624. The court relied on the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), which
grants federal district courts jurisdiction over torts committed by Federal Government employees. Id.
112. Id. at 623-25.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
114. Panella, 216 F.2d at 624.
115. See id.
116. Seeid.
117. Id. at 623.
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2. The Independent Duty Test Becomes the Law of the Land. Sheridan
v. United States
The Second Circuit's reasoning in Panella was adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in Sheridan v. United States."8 In Sheridan, a
heavily intoxicated off-duty serviceman, Carr, was found by several
naval corpsmen in a hospital building owned by the United States
Navy. " 9 The corpsmen attempted to take Carr to the emergency room,
but fled when they discovered that Carr was carrying a rifle, and did not
report the incident, or Carr's presence, to the proper authorities.2 0 Later
that evening Can- fired his rifle into the plaintiffs' automobile, injuring
one of the plaintiffs and causing property damage. 2' Recognizing that it
was facing a circuit split regarding the scope of the assault and battery
exception,'22 the Court began its analysis by looking at the statute's
language and acknowledged that the words "arising out of' could be
broad enough to bar any claim if it was based in any way on an assault
and battery. 12
3
However, citing United States v. Muniz, 24 the Sheridan Court noted
that there are instances where the existence of an assault or battery does
not bar a claim against the federal government for negligence.' 25 In
Muniz, a federal prisoner was severely beaten by other inmates: he
suffered a fractured skull and lost sight in his right eye. 26 Although the
Muniz Court reversed the appellate court's dismissal of the claim, it did
not specifically address the assault and battery exception. 27 In Sheridan,
the Court held that Muniz stood for the proposition that the existence of
an assault and battery is not an absolute bar to federal district court
jurisdiction over a claim against the government for negligently allowing
an assault and battery to occur.
28
118. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392,400-01 (1988).
119. Id. at 395.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 398.
123. Id.
124. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
125. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 398-99 (citing Muniz, 374 U.S. at 152).
126. Muniz, 374 U.S. at 152.
127. Id. at 153.
128. See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 399.
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The Sheridan Court suggested two possible interpretations of
Muniz' 29 The narrower interpretation, which the Court adopted, reasoned
that an assault and battery by a non-employee does not fall under the
assault and battery exception. 3 ' The broader theory, which the Court
neither adopted nor rejected, assumed that because Muniz had alleged an
independent basis for government liability, namely the government's
negligence, his claim did not arise solely out of the assault and battery
but also out of the negligence of the prison officials. 3 ' By adopting the
first theory, the Sheridan Court relied on the Panella court's distinction
between assaults and batteries committed by employees and those
committed by non-employees and moved the emphasis in the FTCA
from "employee" to "acting within the scope of his office or
employment."'
132
Applying this interpretation to the facts of Sheridan, the Supreme
Court found that the assault and battery exception was inapplicable to the
case at bar because Carr was not acting within the scope of his duties
when he fired the shots into the plaintiffs' automobile. 3  Consequently,
his actions did not independently give rise to government liability. 34 The
Court also held, however, that the government could be liable for the
independent negligence of the corpsmen who found Carr and did not
report his presence to the appropriate authorities. 35 The Court observed
that the government owed a duty to the plaintiffs independent of its
employment relationship with the assailant. 36 This duty was based on the
regulations prohibiting possession of firearms on base and on the
corpsmen's voluntarily undertaking to care for an obviously intoxicated
and armed person.'
In Sheridan, the Court also employed a traditional tort law analysis of
duty and causation.'38 Although the Court did not discuss it explicitly, the
corpsmen who found Carr in the hall were acting within the scope of
their duty when they failed to report their discovery to the authorities,
129. See id. at 399-401
130. See id. at 400.
131. Id. at 399.
132. Id. at 401.
133. Id. at 401-02.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 401-04.
136. Id. at 401 (quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65 (1955)).
137. Id.
138. See id.
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thus opening the government up to liability under the FTCA.139 Despite
the fact that the claim would not exist but-for the assault and battery, the
Court did not find that the assault and battery exception barred the
claim. 40 The Court reasoned that the government would be liable if the
assault and battery had been committed by a non-employee and that it
would be absurd to find no liability simply because the assailant was a
government employee.' Since the Sheridan Court found that Carr's
employment status was irrelevant to its decision, it declined to decide
whether negligent hiring, supervision or retention might give rise to
government liability for the injuries resulting from a foreseeable assault
and battery. 14
2
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment of the Court in Sheridan,
but concluded that relying on the assailant's employment status or scope
of duty was a flaw in the majority's reasoning.'43 Instead, according to
Justice O'Connor's dissent, Justice Kennedy focused on the acts or
omissions of the federal government.'" Justice Kennedy observed that it
is a basic precept of tort law that one injury can arise from multiple
wrongful acts. 45 Justice Kennedy criticized the dissent's view, which
advocated the Shearer plurality's but-for analysis, 46 arguing that this
rationale would obliterate the multi-causal nature of many torts and give
no legal significance to negligent acts that may have preceded the assault
and battery. 1
47
However, Justice Kennedy amputated this rationale as it applies to
preceding acts of negligent hiring, retention or supervision. 4  He
reasoned that in many cases it would be easy to assign blame for the
intentional torts of employees to the prior negligence of supervisors and
therefore circumvent the purpose of the exception. 14' Although he did not
use the term "respondeat superior" in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy
appeared to conflate that concept with negligent hiring, retention and
139. See id.
140. Id. at 403.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 403 n.8.
143. Id at 405 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 406.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 406-07.
149. Id. at 407.
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supervision because he did not explain his assertion that proving
negligent hiring, retention or supervision is substantially easier than
proving any other type of negligence. 5' Instead, he simply asserted this
proposition, implying that he was referring to respondeat superior, which
is substantially easier to prove than negligence because it does not
require a showing of duty, causation, breach and injury.' Although
Justice Kennedy recognized that negligence and assault and battery could
be distinct causes of a single injury, he was unwilling to make a
distinction between negligent hiring, retention and supervision and
respondeat superior.'52
To summarize, the U.S. Supreme Court began its examination of the
assault and battery exception to the FTCA with a plurality opinion
narrowly drawing the boundaries on government liability. The Court has
since loosened the strictures around the exception by recognizing that the
government may be liable for the injuries caused by a federal
government employee's assault and battery under certain circumstances.
While the Court has not stated that negligent hiring, retention and
supervision are some of those circumstances, neither have it closed the
door on that possibility.
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS POST-SHERIDAN V UNITED STATES:
DISAGREEING WHETHER HIRING, RETENTION, AND
SUPERVISION ARE INDEPENDENT DUTIES
In the wake of Sheridan, the majority of courts have adopted an
independent duty test that excludes claims based on the government's
negligent hiring, retention and supervision of its employees." 3 Under this
test, the government is only liable if it owes a duty to the victim of the
assault and battery, independent of its employment relationship with the
assailant, and if the government's breach of that duty is a proximate
cause of the victim's injuries.' This doctrine does not extend to include
jurisdiction over claims for the negligent hiring, retention or supervision
of employees who commit assaults and batteries outside of their scope of
duty."' The Ninth Circuit, however, has recognized government liability
150. Id.
151. See 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
152. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 404-08.
153. See Viders, supra note 73, at 452.
154. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 91,95 (D.P.R. 1992).
155. See, e.g., Miami N. Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 939 F. Supp. 53, 56 (D. Me. 1996).
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for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of government
employees where the government knew or should have known that the
employee would likely commit an assault or battery and negligently
hired, retained or supervised the employee." 6
A. A Duty Independent of the Employment Relationship Avoids the
Assault and Battery Exception
After the Sheridan decision, some district courts fashioned an
independent duty test employing the Sheridan Court's reasoning.'57
Under this test, courts considered whether the government owed the
plaintiff an independent duty unconnected to the government's
employment relationship with the assailant. 8 If the government had
some type of special relationship to the plaintiff, then, these courts held,
the assault and battery exception was not a bar to a cause of action.'59
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted this test in Bembenista v.
United States." In Bembenista, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by a
federal medical technician while in an unconscious or semi-conscious
state. 6 ' Six months prior to the Sheridan decision, the district court
hearing the claim dismissed it as barred by the assault and battery
exception.'62 But, after Sheridan, an appellate court held the plaintiff
could proceed under a theory that the government had breached its
"special obligation of protective care" to the plaintiff.'63 The D.C. circuit
court found that under District of Columbia law, the relationship between
a patient and a hospital gave rise to an independent duty to protect
patients from the foreseeable, injurious acts of third persons.'"' Further,
the court stated the breach of this duty of care to Mrs. Bembenista was
unrelated to the medical technician's employment status: no matter who
assaulted Mrs. Bembenista, the government would be liable.'65 The
Bembenista court did not consider whether the defendant was acting
156. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503-05 (9th Cir. 1986).
157. See LaFrancis v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 2d 335, 339 (D. Conn. 1999).
158. See id. at 339.
159. Id.
160. 866 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
161. Id. at 495.
162. Id. at 497.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 498.
165. Id.
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within the scope of his duty when he assaulted Mrs. Bembenista, perhaps
judging that the answer was self-evident or irrelevant to the resolution of
the issues.'66 Other courts have found that an independent duty exists
where children were mistreated by their federally employed teacher,67
infants were injured in a federal hospital,' 68 and customers were sexually
assaulted by a Postmaster while in the post office.1 69
B. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision Claims Barred by the
Assault and Battery Exception Under the Independent Duty
Framework
Courts that have adopted the independent duty test have held that it
stops short of allowing district court jurisdiction over claims for
negligent hiring, retention and supervision.' Although the Sheridan
Court did not preclude courts from finding jurisdiction based on
negligent hiring, retention or supervision, '7' many courts have refused to
extend the logic of Sheridan this far.77 These courts have restricted their
jurisdiction to those cases where a clear duty, independent of the
employment relationship, exists between the United States and the victim
of the assault and battery. 7
3
In Leleux v. United States, the Fifth Circuit employed a narrow
interpretation of the Sheridan Court's statement that government liability
requires that the breach of an independent duty owed by the government
to the victim was a proximate cause of the injury. 1"' In Leleux, a high-
school age navy recruit was seduced by an enlisted petty officer,
Sistrunk, who worked in the recruitment office.'75 As a result of this
encounter, the plaintiff acquired the genital herpes virus and sued the
166. Id. at 498-99.
167. Harris v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 91, 93 (D.P.R. 1992).
168. Gess v. United States, 952 F. Supp. 1529, 1532 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
169. Strange v. United States, 114 F.3d 1189, 1997 WL 295589, at *1 (6th Cir. 1997).
170. See, e.g., Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 757 (5th Cir. 1999); Guccione v. United
States, 878 F.2d 32, 33 (2d Cir. 1989); Miami N., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 939 F. Supp.
53, 56 (D. Me. 1996).
171. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 403 n.8 (1988).
172. See, e.g., Leleux, 178 F.3d at 756; Guccione, 878 F.2d at 33; Miami N., Inc., 939 F. Supp. at
56.
173. See, e.g., Leleux, 178 F.3d at 757; Guccione, 878 F.2d at 33; Miami N., Inc., 939 F. Supp. at
56.
174. 178 F.3d 750, 757 (5th Cir. 1999).
175. Id. at 753.
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federal government under the FTCA' 76 Although a compelling argument
could be made that the government owes a duty of care to the young
people it actively recruits, the circuit court determined that this was an
employee-third party relationship with no special duty owed to the
plaintiff.177 Further, the Fifth Circuit found that any government
negligence that existed was directly related to the government's
employment relationship with Sistrunk and therefore barred by the
assault and battery exception. 7 Thus, the circuit court held that the
plaintiff's case was barred by the assault and battery exception because
the government did not owe an independent duty to the plaintiff.'79
Similarly, in Franklin v. United States,' the Tenth Circuit found that
the lack of an independent duty could bar a claim under the FTCA.' In
Franklin, a patient at a VA hospital in Oklahoma died after an operation
was performed on him without his consent.' 2 Analyzing general and
Oklahoma tort law, the circuit court found that the performance of an
operation without consent sounds in medical battery and not
negligence. 3 Although the court cited Sheridan, it found that any duty
owed the plaintiff was a direct result of the hospital employees'
employment status. 84 Therefore, there was no duty owed the plaintiff
independent of the hospital workers employment relationship with the
federal government and Sheridan was inapplicable.' While the court
found that the assault and battery exception would normally provide a
bar to this case, a narrow exception authorizing government liability for
torts committed by VA personnel allowed the case to go forward.' 6
Two other courts have also found that the Sheridan rationale does not
extend to claims for negligent hiring, retention or supervision. In
Bajkowski v. United States"7 a district court in the Eastern District of
North Carolina held that the assault and battery exception barred a claim
for negligent retention and supervision of an employee of the United
176. Id.
177. Id. at 758.
178. Id. at 757-58.
179. Id. at 759.
180. 992 F.2d 1492 (10th Cir. 1993).
181. See id. at 1498-99.
182. Id. at 1495.
183. Id. at 1497.
184. Id. at 1499.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1499-1502.
187. 787 F. Supp. 539 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
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States Army.' 8 The army re-enlisted the assailant despite his criminal
record. 9 Three weeks before he attacked the plaintiff, the Army released
the assailant pending a trial for rape. 0 The court held that if the assailant
were not a member of the armed forces at the time of the attack, the
government would have no duty to supervise him or monitor his
behavior.' Therefore, the case did not fall within the scope of Sheridan
and was barred by the assault and battery exception to the FTCA.
192
Similarly, in Malone v. United States,193 a district court in the
Southern District of Georgia found that a claim for negligent supervision
of an employee of the United States Army was barred by the assault and
battery exception."9 In Malone, the employee, Woods, had already
violently raped another woman when he attacked the plaintiff.9 5 After he
was arrested for this crime, his commanding officers placed him under
restricted status.'96 However, they transferred Woods to another location
and the commanding officer in charge of Woods' restriction did not tell
anyone who might have been able to stop Woods from leaving the base
about his restricted status. 97 Woods violated this restriction, left the base,
met the plaintiff in a bar and forcibly raped and sodomized her. 98
Despite this lax supervision of a known rapist, the court determined that
a claim for negligent supervision was barred by the assault and battery
exception to the FTCA because there was no affirmative, independent
duty owed to the plaintiff outside of the federal government's
employment relationship with the assailant. ' 99
In sum, many courts have refused to extend the logic of Shearer to
negligent hiring, retention and supervision. These courts have restricted
their jurisdiction to those cases where a clear duty, independent of the
employment relationship, exists between the United States and the victim
of the assault and battery.
188. Id. at 540.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 541-42.
193. 61 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (S.D. Ga. 1999).
194. Id. at 1380-82 (holding that plaintiff's claims also barred by both Georgia immunity and the
Mindes rule that judicial review of military decisions should be avoided).
195. Id. at 1374.
196. Id. at 1376.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1376-77.
199. Id. at 1380-81.
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C. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision Claims are
Actionable Under the FTCA in the Ninth Circuit
Even before Sheridan, the Ninth Circuit had interpreted the assault
and battery exception to be inapplicable to cases involving negligent
hiring, supervision or retention of a government employee. 200 In Bennett
v. United States,201 an early Ninth Circuit case, the court allowed a suit to
go forward for negligent hiring and retention of a government
employee.20 2 In Bennett, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) hired a
teacher for one of its boarding schools who had previously been arrested
and charged with child molestation.2 3 While he was at the BIA boarding
school, the teacher kidnapped, assaulted and raped several students.2 ,
The teacher had admitted on his application that he had been arrested and
charged with violating an Oklahoma statute outlawing "Outrage to
Public Decency," but the BIA did not investigate this admission.2 5 Such
an investigation would have revealed that the prior charges were for
molestation similar to what had occurred at the BIA boarding school.2 6
The government admitted that hiring and retaining the teacher was
negligent, but argued that the claim was barred by the assault and battery
exception to the FTCA.207 The Ninth Circuit disagreed and held that the
assault and battery exception was not a bar to liability. 28 Although the
court noted the Shearer plurality's conclusion that the assault and battery
exception bars claims for negligent supervision of an employee who
commits an intentional tort, it declined to follow this rationale.2 9
The Bennett court had several rationales for deciding that the assault
and battery exception does not bar a claim for negligent supervision of a
government employee who commits an assault and battery.210 The
Bennett court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Jablonski v. United
States,2 ' in which the court held that the assault and battery exception
200. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1503-05 (9th Cir. 1986).
201. 803 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986).
202. Id. at 1504-05.
203. Id. at 1503.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1505.
209. See id. at 1503.
210. See id.
211. 712 F.2d 391 (9thCir. 1983).
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did not excuse government negligence." 2 In Jablonski, the court noted
that one of the major policy reasons behind the intentional tort
exceptions to the FTCA was to prevent the government from having to
defend lawsuits for acts it was powerless to prevent." 3 Applying this
rationale to the Bennett case, the court determined that the government
should have known that the teacher posed a serious risk to the children at
the BIA boarding school and therefore liability was not based on
respondeat superior, and therefore an employee's act it was powerless to
prevent, but on the government's own independent negligence.214 Thus,
the problem of being forced to defend lawsuits for acts beyond its power
was not an issue."s
Further, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Shearer plurality's notion that
the government's immunity is waived only if the tortfeasor is a non-
employee.21 6 The Bennett court ruled that this conclusion was anything
but certain.2"7 The court discerned no evidence in the congressional
record that Congress meant to open the government up to liability for
negligently supervising non-employees but not its own employees.
218
Additionally, the court recognized a clear distinction between claims for
respondeat superior, which are barred by the assault and battery
exception, and claims based on the government's own negligence.2"9
Finally, the court noted that the broad immunity suggested by the
Shearer plurality was inconsistent with the overarching purpose of the
FTCA: to provide redress for those who have been injured as a proximate
result of government negligence.220
The Ninth Circuit continued to rely on this analysis after the Sheridan
opinion. In Brock v. United States,22' the Ninth Circuit held that the
assault and battery exception did not bar a claim by a U.S. Forest Service
employee who was sexually harassed and raped by her supervisor,
McKinney, on assignment in the field.22 After she was raped, she
212. See Bennett, 803 F.2d at 1503-05.
213. See id. at 1503-04.
214. See id. at 1503 (citing Jablonski ex rel. Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir.1983)).
215. See id.
216. Seeid. at 1504.
217. See id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 64 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
222. Id. at 1425.
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refused to go back into the field with McKinney and was transferred to a
desk job where sexual harassment and unwanted touching by McKinney
continued.223 Eventually, the plaintiff was transferred to another
department to avoid further contact with McKinney. 224 After filing a
claim against the government for McKinney's behavior and for
government negligence in failing to properly supervise him, although
they knew of his behavior, she was subject to torment by her
colleagues. 225 The Ninth Circuit refused to hold that the claims for
negligent supervision were barred by the assault and battery exception to
the FTCA. 226 The court recognized that the question remained open in the
wake of Sheridan27 and relied on Ninth Circuit precedent in Bennett to
hold that claims for negligent hiring and supervision of employees who
commit intentional torts are not barred by the assault and battery
exception.228
The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed this conclusion most recently in Senger
v. United States.229 In Senger, a tow truck operator was attempting to tow
a U.S. Postal Service employee's truck from the parking lot of the Main
Post Office in Portland at the request of the Postal Service.23 While
doing this, he was assaulted by the car's owner, a Postal Service
employee.23 ' The court held that the plaintiffs claim that the post office
inadequately supervised an employee for a business invitee was not
barred by the assault and battery exception. 2 The Ninth Circuit
reaffirmed the distinction between claims for respondeat superior, which
are barred by the assault and battery exception, and claims for negligent
supervision, which are not barred. 33
As set forth above, the Ninth Circuit continues to hold that the assault
and battery exception is not a bar to claims for negligent hiring,
retention, and supervision despite opinions to the contrary. Many of the
contrary opinions come from courts that have held that their jurisdiction
223. Id. at 1422.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1425.
227. Id. (citing Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 403 n.8 (1988)).
228. Id. at 1425.
229. 103 F.3d 1437 (9th Cir. 1996).
230. Id. at 1438.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 1442-43.
233. Id. at 1441.
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is constrained to cases where a clear duty, independent of the
employment relationship, exists between the government and the
plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion by ruling
that the intent behind the FTCA was to provide redress to citizens injured
by governmental negligence, and therefore the assault and battery
exception is not a bar to claims for negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision. Further, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished between those
claims, which are rooted in negligence, and those that are based solely on
respondeat superior and that negligent hiring, retention, and supervision
claims are allowed under the FTCA.
V. THE ASSAULT AND BATTERY EXCEPTION TO THE
FEDERAL TORTS CLAIM ACT DOES NOT BAR CLAIMS
FOR NEGLIGENT HIRING, RETENTION OR SUPERVISION
Synthesizing the language and history of the FTCA, the substance of a
claim for negligent hiring, retention or supervision, and past precedent,
reveals that the assault and battery exception does not deny federal
district courts jurisdiction to hear such claims. Reading the assault and
battery exception to bar federal district courts from hearing negligent
hiring, retention, and supervision claims against the federal government
substantially frustrates the overarching purpose of the FTCA to provide a
remedy for the negligent acts of government officials. 34 Further, the
negligent acts of federal employees in the hiring, retention and
supervision of other federal employees are readily distinguishable from
the intentional assaults and batteries themselves.235 Because virtually all
FTCA claims are heard before a judge, claims that truly are barred can be
dismissed through the normal channels of federal civil procedure without
the danger that a jury will confuse a claim for respondeat superior with
negligence.236 Finally, the United States Supreme Court's use of
traditional tort law in Sheridan urges a reading of the assault and battery
exception which allows federal district courts jurisdiction over claims
based on a government employee's negligence in hiring, retaining or
supervising another federal employee.237
234. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
235. See supra Part I.
236. See supra note 55.
237. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
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A. Interpreting the Assault and Battery Exception to Bar only
Respondeat Superior Claims is Consistent with its Legislative
History and Language
Interpreting the assault and battery exception in the context of its
legislative history and the FTCA as a whole, it is clear that the
exception's scope should be limited to claims for respondeat superior.
The assault and battery exception's legislative history indicates that
Congress intended to provide a mechanism for redress for citizens
injured by the negligent acts of government employees.238 Additionally,
the FTCA only provides liability for the negligent acts of employees
acting within their scope of duty.239 Once employees act outside of that
scope of duty, the FTCA no longer provides a remedy.24 If the FTCA
does not provide a remedy, then the assault and battery exception is
irrelevant. 24' However, the FTCA does provide a remedy for the
negligence of a federal employee in hiring, retaining and supervising
another federal employee who commits an assault and battery. This is
because such a claim is predicated on the government's negligence, not
the assault and battery of the employee, for which the FTCA does not
provide a remedy regardless of the assault and battery exception.242
Therefore, the government is liable for the negligent acts of federal
employees who supervise employees who commit an assault and battery
outside of their scope of duty.243 Finally, the ultimate purpose of the
FTCA is to provide a remedy for citizens wronged by the negligence of
government officials 244 and interpreting the assault and battery exception
too broadly undermines this purpose.
The sparse legislative history associated with the assault and battery
exception to the FTCA indicates that Congress intended to waive the
government's immunity for negligent acts or omissions of the Federal
Government.245 One of the few mentioned underlying concerns driving
the passage of the assault and battery exception was that the government
did not want to have to litigate intentional torts that are difficult to
238. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 111-17, 129-37 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 110, 114-17, 220 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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defend and easily exaggerated.246 Negligent hiring, retention and
supervision claims, on the other hand, are not more difficult to defend
than other types of negligence claims for which the government has
waived immunity.2 4 Congress' concern, paired with the relative ease of
defending negligence claims, exposes Congress's intent that the assault
and battery exception is only a bar to claims for vicarious liability for the
intentional torts of government employees. Claims for negligent hiring,
retention and supervision require the plaintiff to prove the same elements
of duty, breach, causation and harm as in any other negligence claim.24
If Congress was concerned about the government's liability for more
easily proven claims, then they were most likely referring to claims for
respondeat superior liability for intentional torts which merely require a
showing that an intentional tort was committed by an employee of the
federal government within the employee's scope of employment. 49
The later Congressional Amendment to the assault and battery
exception allowing for government liability when federal law
enforcement officers commit an intentional assault and battery does not
alter the fundamental analysis of the exception. While the Shearer
plurality reasoned that this amendment to the assault and battery
exception demonstrated Congress' belief that the government would not
be liable in any way when a federal employee commits an assault and
battery, the plurality did not recognize that these assaults and batteries
are the very few that will most likely be committed in the scope of
duty.25 This amendment to the assault and battery exception allows for
liability when federal investigative or law enforcement officers are
accused of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution.25" ' Congress detailed part of these
officers' job description in the amendment, noting that law enforcement
and investigative officers have the power to execute searches, to seize
evidence, and to make arrests for violations of Federal law.252 This
inclusion evidences Congress' acknowledgment that these types of
246. See Zolensky, supra note 63, at 811 n.43.
247. See id. at 811-12 (noting that while the element of intent in an intentional assault and battery
is easily proven, proving that the negligence of an employee caused that assault and battery is not).
248. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228, at 504 (1958); Zolensky, supra note 63, at
811.
250. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
251. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
252. Id.
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officers will be accused of on-the-job assaults and batteries." 3 Because
these assaults and batteries are committed within the employee's scope
of duty they are exempt from this Comment's analysis: these assaults and
batteries are within the scope of the FTCA and were, prior to the
amendment, barred by the assault and battery exception.254 In contrast,
assaults and batteries committed outside of the scope of duty are not
within the ambit of the FTCA and therefore antecedent negligence that
caused these assaults and batteries may subject the government to
liability under the FTCA.2"5 This amendment does not support the
Shearer plurality's conclusion that the assault and battery exception bars
claims for the negligent hiring, retention and supervision of government
employees acting outside of their scope of duty.
Analyzing the assault and battery exception as part of a larger piece of
legislation, it is clear that it only applies to respondeat superior claims for
intentional torts committed within the scope of the employee's duty. As
the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Sheridan, the FTCA only waives
sovereign immunity for injuries caused by an "employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment., 26 Therefore, according to the Court, the assault and
battery exception does not apply to assaults and batteries committed by
employees acting outside of their scope of employment. 257 The Sheridan
Court concluded that the assault and battery exception did not apply to
the assault and battery in that case because the assailant was acting
outside of his scope of duty.258 The Court then determined that the
government had breached a duty owed to the plaintiff to report persons
who had unauthorized weapons on the base and that this breach was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries.2"9  Similarly, if the
government's negligent hiring, retention or supervision of an employee is
the proximate cause of an assault and battery by a federal employee
acting outside of his or her scope of duty, the assault and battery
exception is irrelevant.26° Once the assault and battery exception has been
removed from the equation, the district courts have jurisdiction because
253. See id.
254. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 129-42.
256. Sheridan, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at401-02.
259. See id. at 402.
260. See supra notes 132-34.
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the claim is predicated on the government's negligence, not the
employee's assault and battery.2 ' To conclude otherwise would deny the
premise relied on by the Supreme Court in Sheridan that the assault and
battery exception does not apply to claims where the government
employee acted outside of his or her scope of duty.26
Viewed in light of the overarching purpose of the FTCA, the
ambiguous language of the assault and battery exception should be
construed to allow district courts jurisdiction to hear claims for negligent
hiring, retention and supervision. While the arising out of language could
literally be read to deny federal district courts jurisdiction for any claim
related to an assault or battery,263 this language becomes ambiguous
when an injury is proximately caused by both an intentional tort and
negligence."6 When this happens the injury could be said to arise out of
negligence or the intentional tort and it is necessary to consider the intent
of the entire FTCA to properly interpret the exception. While the main
purpose of the FTCA was to replace the arduous private bill process used
at the time to compensate plaintiffs for injury at the hands of the federal
government, 265 a second and almost equally important purpose was to
compensate plaintiffs who had been injured by the federal government's
negligence.266 This second purpose makes clear that the FTCA waives
sovereign immunity for claims arising out of negligence but preserves it
for claims arising out of intentional torts that were not caused by the
independent negligence of the federal government. Taken as a whole, the
FTCA and the legislative history of the assault and battery exception
suggest that the exception should not be interpreted to deny government
liability for negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims.
B. The Assault and Battery Exception is Not a Bar to Actions Claiming
Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision of Government
Employees Because Such Torts are Analytically Distinct from the
Assault and Battery by an Employee
Claims founded on negligent hiring, retention and supervision of
employees who act outside of their scope of duty should not be barred by
261. See supra notes 132-34.
262. See Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 400.
263. Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52, 55 (1985).
264. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 398.
265. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
266. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1953).
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the assault and battery exception to the FTCA because they are distinct
from claims based solely on the intentionally tortious conduct of the
employee. 267 Negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims are based
on the independent negligence of the employer,268 in this case the federal
government, and thus do not arise solely out of the assault and battery of
the employee. While courts purport to fear that claims that are actually
based on vicarious liability will be couched in terms of negligent hiring,
retention and supervision, the two torts are analytically distinct and any
hidden respondeat superior claims can be dispensed with through the
normal channels of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.269
1. Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision Claims are based on
the Independent Negligence of the Employer and are Readily
Distinguished from Claims for Respondeat Superior
Although the injury involved in a negligent hiring, retention and
supervision claim can be the result of an intentional assault and battery,
such claims are founded on the employer's independent negligence and
not solely on the employee's assault and battery.27 In most jurisdictions,
in order to prove negligent hiring, retention or supervision, the plaintiff
cannot just prove that the employee committed an intentional tort, but
must prove that the employer knew, or reasonably should have known,
that the employee was dangerous.27' Further, as with any independent
negligence claim, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's negligence
proximately caused the injury.272 Therefore, a claim for negligent hiring,
retention and supervision is rooted in the independent negligence of the
employer and arises out of that negligent act or omission.2 73 Since the
assault and battery exception only bars those claims which arise out of
intentional torts, this exception should not bar claims based on the
independent negligence of a federal government employee acting within
267. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
268. Id.
269. See. e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
270. See Ellen M. Martin & Lee Ann Anderson, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, 30TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON
EMPLOYMENT LAW WORKPLACE CLAIMS, WRONGFUL TERMINATION, COLLATERAL TORTS,
PRIVACY, RESTRICTIONS ON RIGHT TO COMPETE, REFERENCE CHECKS, AND INVESTIGATIONS
1118-19 (2001); 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996); Thomas M. Winn, 111,
Labor and Employment Law, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 725,734-36 (2001).
271. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
272. Id.
273. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
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his or her scope of duty when hiring, retaining or supervising another
federal employee.274
Respondeat superior claims, which are based on vicarious liability and
are barred by the assault and battery exception, are readily
distinguishable from claims based on negligent hiring, retention and
supervision.275 Respondeat superior claims are founded entirely on the
employee's intentionally tortious act and do not require any proof of
negligence on the part of the employer.276 Claims based on the theory of
respondeat superior posit that the employer should be liable for the
wrongful acts of his or her employee if that employee was acting on the
employer's behalf, that is, within the employee's scope of duty.277 Such
claims arise out of the intentionally tortious conduct of the employee and
have no basis in the employer's independent negligence.27 8 In contrast,
negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims are not based solely on
the employee committing an assault and battery but have separate and
distinct roots in the employer's negligence.279
2. Courts Can Dismiss Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision
Claims that are Revealed to be Claims for Respondeat Superior
The risk that plaintiffs will successfully disguise their respondeat
superior claims with allegations of negligent supervision is overstated.
The assault and battery exception does not merely prevent a cause of
action from arising, but denies the federal district courts subject matter
jurisdiction for claims arising out of assault and battery.28 Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), respondeat superior claims that are
disguised as negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims must be
dismissed as soon as their true nature becomes clear.28' Although the
notice pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
only require notice of the claims that the plaintiff is alleging, such
pleadings still require the plaintiff to inform the defendant of the
274. Bennett v. United States, 803 F.2d 1502, 1504 (9th Cir. 1986).
275. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
276. Id.
277. 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages § 788 (1996).
278. See id.
279. 27 AM. JUR. 2d Employment Relationship § 472 (1996).
280. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2000).
281. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
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allegations.28 2 As a result, the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is often
evident at the pleading stage of litigation if the pleadings do not allege
any circumstances beyond the employee's tortious conduct.2 3 Even if the
litigation moves beyond the pleading stage, the government may make a
motion for summary judgment to uncover whether any factual basis
exists for the negligence claim.28 4 Utilizing the rules of civil procedure
would preserve the purpose of the assault and battery exception, to avoid
litigating a claim arising out of assault and battery. It also would advance
the overall purpose of the FTCA: to provide a forum for meritorious
claims against the government for its own negligence.
Although one could argue that the fact finder could confuse the
concepts of negligent hiring, retention and supervision with respondeat
superior, this concern is practically non-existent in the context of FTCA
litigation. While the distinctions between respondeat superior and
negligent hiring, retention and supervision are clear in theory, it is true
that the distinction may begin to blur for a jury faced with a sympathetic
plaintiff, an employee who has done something wrong, and an employer
with deep pockets. However, almost all FTCA cases are argued before a
judge,285 and therefore the danger of confusing the two doctrines is
greatly reduced.
In sum, the negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims are not
barred by the assault and battery exception to the FTCA. Such claims are
analytically distinct from the federal employee's intentionally tortious
actions and therefore cannot be disguised as a claim for respondeat
superior. Any risk that these respondeat superior claims are masked as
negligent hiring, retention, or supervision is negated by the fact-finding
role played by the federal judge in FTCA claims. Because a judge and
not a jury will determine the nature of the claim asserted, the judge can
dismiss any meritless claims through the normal channels of civil
procedure.
282. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.7, at 258 (3d ed. 1999).
283. See Bryson v. United States, 463 F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Penn. 1978) (noting that courts can
and have examined the facts of a case to see if there is a claim evident beyond the assault and battery
of the employee. If there is not, the courts simply dismiss the claim).
284. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 282, at § 9.1,452.
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000); see also SISK, supra note 55, at 72-79.
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C. Allowing Negligent Hiring, Retention and Supervision Claims when
an Employee Acts Outside of his or her Scope of Employment is
Consistent with Sheridan v. United States and Ninth Circuit
Precedent
The U.S. Supreme Court in Sheridan refused to interpret the "arising
out-of' language of the assault and battery exception to bar any claim
that would not exist but-for the intentional tort.286 Instead, the Court
adopted an interpretation based on principles of basic tort law.287 The
Court held that the government can be held liable for the breach of an
independent duty owed to the plaintiff that causes an assault and battery
by a government employee acting outside of his or her scope of duty.288
The Court's refusal to adopt this rationale implies that the FTCA's
assault and battery exception does not apply to federal employees'
negligent acts of hiring, retention or supervision of other employees who
commit intentional torts outside of their scope of duty.
The Supreme Court's traditional tort law analysis in Sheridan requires
a reading of the assault and battery exception to grant jurisdiction to
federal district courts to hear claims for the negligent hiring, retention
and supervision of federal employees. The Sheridan Court determined
that the assault and battery exception did not bar claims based on an
employee's intentional assault and battery while acting outside the scope
of duty, if the government owed a duty to the victim that was
independent of the employment relationship.289 The Court concluded that
because the employee in Sheridan was not acting within his scope of
duty when he shot at the plaintiffs' car, the FTCA would not have
provided a remedy regardless of the assault and battery exception.29 ° The
Sheridan Court thus rejected the Shearer plurality's insistence on a
reading of the assault and battery exception that would bar any cause of
action connected to an intentional assault and battery, and instead held
that the plaintiff could proceed against the government based on its
independent negligence.29'
Although the Sheridan Court couched its analysis in terms of the
employee acting outside the scope of duty, the Court ultimately held that
286. Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1988).
287. See id.
288. See id. at 403.
289. See id. at 402-03.
290. See id. at 401.
291. Id. at 402-03.
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the exception's arising out of language does not apply where the claim is
based on a negligent act of the government independent of the intentional
tort of the assailant.2  Employing this analysis, it does not matter
whether that duty was based on the employment relationship or on some
other independent duty owed. If the federal government owes a duty to
the plaintiff under the law of the forum state, then an injury caused by a
breach of that duty should be actionable under the FTCA. The FTCA
provides a remedy for the negligent acts of government employees
293
while the assault and battery exception exempts the government from
liability for the solely intentional torts of its employees.294 This exception
does not apply if the assault and battery was made possible by the
independent, negligent act of a government employee within the ambit of
the FTCA.295 Distinguishing between distinct duties owed based on
whether they are independent of the employment relationship is arbitrary
and relies on the faulty logic of the but-for analysis rejected by the
Sheridan court.296
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's rationale in Bennett v. United States is a
persuasive reason for allowing suits for the negligent hiring, retention
and supervision of government employees who commit assaults and
batteries outside of their scope of duty. First, these types of suits do not
implicate the major policy concern motivating the assault and battery
exception; they do not make the government liable for suits that are
difficult to defend and for actions that it was powerless to prevent.297 The
premise behind the tort of negligent hiring, retention and supervision is
that the employer knew or should have known that its employee was a
threat to third parties and therefore could have prevented the employer's
tortious act.298 Second, the Ninth Circuit noted that there is no evidence
in the legislative history of the FTCA that Congress intended to accept
liability for the negligent supervision of non-employees but not its own
employees.299 If the government is liable for negligent supervision for
one group of individuals, it is logically inconsistent to exempt the
government from liability for the identical negligent supervision of a
292. Id. at 401.
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000).
294. Id. § 2680(h).
295. Sheridan, 487 U.S. at 398.
296. Id.
297. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
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different group of individuals. Third, as the Ninth Circuit noted,
negligent hiring, retention and supervision claims are distinct from
respondeat superior.300 Finally, the court recognized that a broad
interpretation of the assault and battery exception is inconsistent with the
FTCA's purpose to provide a remedy to individuals injured by
government negligence.3' Ultimately, both Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit precedent urge a reading of the assault and battery exception that
makes the government liable for the negligent hiring, retention, and
supervision of employees who commit assault and battery.
V. CONCLUSION
The FTCA's assault and battery exception should not be interpreted to
bar federal courts from hearing claims for the negligent hiring, retention
and supervision of government employees. Such a reading substantially
frustrates one of Congress' central purposes in enacting the FTCA:
providing a remedy for injuries caused by the negligent acts of
government officials. Claims for negligent hiring, retention and
supervision are rooted in the negligence of government officials.
Although some courts may fear that allowing such claims would allow
barred respondeat superior claims to slip through the cracks, this fear is
unfounded. The federal district court judges who hear negligent hiring,
retention and supervision claims can dismiss those that are revealed to be
respondeat superior claims. Finally, allowing these claims is a natural
extension of U.S. Supreme Court's logic in Sheridan v. United States.
The Court recognized that the negligent acts of government employees
open the government up to liability under the FTCA regardless of
whether the injury was caused by an assault and battery by a government
employee acting outside of his scope of duty.
300. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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